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161 
CAUTION, YOUR CIVIL LIBERTIES MAY HAVE 
SHIFTED DURING THE FLIGHT: JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WARSAW 
CONVENTION 
INTRODUCTION 
How much authority should flight attendants have to ensure safety on a 
plane? How liable should an airline be for not protecting its passengers as 
they travel? What is the balance between safety and personal freedom?  
When Dr. Neville Gibbs asked a question, he was detained because a 
flight attendant was “having a bad day” and did not like the way “black 
people” were behaving, yet the court determined that the airline could not 
be held liable for its employee.1 Two men held hands on an American 
Airlines flight and were threatened with detention because the crew 
members did not approve.2 An Australian man was not allowed to fly 
because of a political t-shirt he was wearing.3 Airlines operating 
international flights have absolute freedom to discriminate against their 
passengers based on race, language, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
or even clothing, because from security to arrival, passengers are barred 
 
 
 1. Gibbs v. American Airlines, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 144, 145 (D.D.C. 2002). On February 6, 
1999, Dr. Gibbs, an African American, boarded a plane from Miami to Trinidad. Id. A flight attendant 
came down the aisle distributing immigration cards. Id. Gibbs’ companion asked the attendant how 
things were going, and she replied that it had been a “rough day” and “commented in an allegedly 
‘derogatory’ tone of voice that the ‘black people’ on the plane were misbehaving, and that her white 
colleagues were asking her why the ‘black people’ were behaving that way.” Id. 
Dr. Gibbs asked his companion and the flight attendant what they were discussing, and the 
flight attendant “allegedly became ‘very confrontational’ and snapped, ‘That's exactly what 
I'm talking about!’ She then approached Dr. Gibbs, leaned in close to his face, and shook her 
finger at him while loudly repeating, ‘That is none of your business.’ Dr. Gibbs told [her] she 
was being rude, to which she allegedly responded in a heated voice, ‘I could put you off this 
plane!’”  
Id. The aircraft’s purser warned Gibbs for violating 14 C.F.R. § 91.11. The Captain of the plane 
ordered Dr. Gibbs removed from the plane. Id. at 146. “The Captain never spoke to Dr. Gibbs 
personally, but ordered him off the plane because he felt ‘he had to back his crew.’” Id. at 146 n.3.  
Dr. Gibbs was detained by the police in the terminal and questioned about his conduct on the 
plane. After Dr. Gibbs explained his version of the incident, the police decided that no 
criminal activity had occurred and released him. . . . Dr. Gibbs alleged common law tort and 
contract claims, as well as statutory discrimination claims under Section 1981 and the Federal 
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41310.  
Id. at 146. The court found that this cause of action was preempted. Because Dr. Gibbs did not receive 
a physical injury, he cannot recover under the Warsaw Convention. 
 2. Collins, infra note 106. 
 3. EL PAIS, infra note 122. 
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from recovering from airlines for claims of discrimination, civil rights 
violations, and mental injury.4  
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States 
government, airports, and the airlines have drastically changed their 
security policies.5 Critics argue that the policies are racist, discriminatory, 
and subjective.6 Cases report that flight attendants on international flights 
dominate the air with threats, arrests, and detainment of passengers, yet 
when these determinations are unfounded, passengers have no means of 
recovery.7 Despite the initial decrease in flight capacity after the terrorist 
attacks, many Americans now choose to travel internationally.8 2006 
reports indicate that international travel is continuing to grow and is at 
record capacity.9 
 
 
 4. El Al Israel Airlines, LTD v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169 (1999). 
 5. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44903 (Air Transportation Security effective August 3, 2007). The September 
11, 2001, attacks led to increased security measures and a complete overhaul of the flying process.  
The most visible security changes may be on the airplanes themselves . . . . many planes have 
installed bulletproof, locked cockpit doors, securing the pilot and flight crew from the rest of 
the plane. There have also been attempts to install CCTV systems as a cabin monitoring 
system . . . . The U.S. Senate last week passed a bill that includes provisions to arm pilots in 
the cockpit. The House of Representatives passed a similar bill allowing the creation of a 
firearms training program for pilots who volunteer as special deputies.  
The Transportation Security Administration was created in 2001, and it initiated mandatory upgrades 
in baggage screening technology and procedures. Transportation Security, Airport Security Since 9/11: 
How Far Have We Come?, http://transportationsec.com/ar/security_airport_security_far/index.htm 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2007). See also infra notes 10–11.  
 6. Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery 
Slopes and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 241 (2005) (arguing that fears of slippery 
slopes in the war on terror are justified); Thomas M. McDonnell, Targeting the Foreign Born by Race 
and Nationality: Counter-Productive in the “War on Terrorism”?, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 19, 54 
(2004); Andrew Hessick, The Federalization of Airport Security: Privacy Implications, 24 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 43, 68 (2002); Amnesty International USA, infra note 13. 
 7. Gibbs, 191 F. Supp. 2d 144, supra note 1; infra note 54. 
 8. “The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that while international arrivals to the U.S. 
declined 4% in 2003 to a total of 40.1 million visitors, international visitation will increase by 16% 
from 2002 to 2007 to 45 million international visitors.” Judy L. Randall & Dr. Larry D. Gustke, Top 
Ten Travel and Tourism Trends, 2004 13, http://www.rtmnet.com/Portals/1/2004 TravelTrends.pdf. 
In the August preceding 9/11, the airline industry experienced what was then a record high in 
the number of airline passengers for a given month when 65.4 million travelers took to the air. 
After 9/11, that number trailed off dramatically, and it took nearly 3 years, until July 2004, for 
the industry to match and finally surpass the pre 9/11 levels. But the number of available 
seats—an industry measure of capacity—in July 2004 was just 98.3% of its August 2001 
peak. By July 2005, the number of airline passengers had reached 71 million.  
BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, ISSUE BRIEF 13: AIRLINE TRAVEL SINCE 9/11 (Dec. 
2005), http://www.bts.gov/publications/issue_briefs/number_13/html/entire.html.  
 9.  Airports Council International reports that airports held a record capacity of 4.4 billion 
passengers in 2006. Robert Evans, World Airports Saw Record Passengers in 2006, July 18, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSL1886076320070718?feedType=RSS&rpc=22
&sp=true.  
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Whether vacationing with family or traveling for a business meeting, 
ease, efficiency, and price make flying the most appropriate form of 
international travel. Some passengers are comforted by the new security 
measures implemented by the Department of Homeland Security, while 
others are now scrutinized by airport security and other passengers.10 The 
government has even asked the public to take a more active approach to 
airport security by paying extra attention to those around them and by 
observing the color warnings of the Homeland Security Advisory 
System.11 The media has covered failures in past security methods for 
protecting travelers, and it has highlighted the success of passengers in 
protecting themselves.12 Passenger, government, and air carrier activism 
has led to questions regarding procedural limits and legal liability of the 
airlines in protecting passengers.13  
 
 
 10. McDonnell, supra note 6 at 53. Since 9/11, the United States government has created 
measures to help private citizens be more aware of potential threats to their security. For example, the 
government implemented a color-coded threat level campaign in March 2002. The protective measures 
were created to 
reduce vulnerability or increase response capability during a period of heightened alert. . . . It 
seeks to inform and facilitate decisions appropriate to different levels of government and to 
private citizens at home and at work . . . . The Homeland Security Advisory System shall be 
binding on the executive branch and suggested, although voluntary, to other levels of 
government and the private sector. There are five Threat Conditions, each identified by a 
description and corresponding color. From lowest to highest, the levels and colors are:  
  Low = Green;  
  Guarded = Blue;  
  Elevated = Yellow;  
  High = Orange;  
  Severe = Red.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC 394 (Mar. 12, 2002); 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html.  
 11. Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on August 10, 2006, following 
alleged terrorist activities in Britain: “As always, we ask the American public to remain aware and 
vigilant, and report any activity that they think is suspicious to local authorities or other appropriate 
law enforcement agencies.” Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary, August Press Conference 
(Aug. 10, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.tsa.gov/press/speeches/dhs_press_conference_0801 
2006.htm). 
 12. Two films describe the success of passengers on flight United 93 in preventing terrorists 
from crashing their plane into a populated building. UNITED 93 (Universal Pictures 2006); Flight 93 
(A&E Television Networks broadcast Jan. 30, 2006); See Sean Smith & Joe Chebaton’s, A Dark Day 
Revisited, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 10, 2006, at 60, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12112802/ 
site/newsweek/; See Airport Technology, Taking Pride in Passenger Protection, http://www.airport-
technology.com/features/feature563/; See also Heather MacDonald, What We Don’t Know Can Hurt 
Us, CITY JOURNAL, http://www.city-journal.org/html/14_2_what_we_dont_know.html (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2007). 
 13. Hessick, supra note 6 at 48. Private citizens have been subjected to limits on liquids and 
baggage, as well as pat downs and random security screenings, since September 2001. Amnesty 
International reports incidents of passengers who feel they are the target of security screenings because 
of their race. Amnesty International USA, Threat and Humiliation (2004); see also Bill McGee, When 
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In choosing to travel, passengers do not know what they might 
encounter when they purchase their tickets.14 There are many 
consequences to one’s civil rights in choosing to fly “the friendly skies” 
over the United States.15 The consequences to one’s civil rights are more 
drastic when choosing to fly internationally.16  
The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Transportation by Air,17 more commonly known as the 
Warsaw Convention, was drafted in 1929 and governs an international air 
carrier’s liability for “injury and damage” to passengers and baggage.18 
The Warsaw Convention is a “comprehensive international treaty 
governing liability of carriers in all international transportation of persons, 
baggage, and goods.”19 The main objectives of the Warsaw Convention 
were to “limit an air carrier’s liability in the event of disasters,” to 
“achieve uniformity in documentation for transportation,” “to avoid 
conflict of law problems,” and to “facilitate international travel.”20  
 
 
Does Airline Security Go Too Far?, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/travel/columnist/mcgee/ 
2004-05-11-mcgee_x.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2007) (discussing the Computer Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System (CAPPS II) and the Registered Traveler Pilot Program (RTPP)). 
 14. Many passengers do not anticipate the scrutiny they may face because of their social, 
religious or cultural traditions. CNN.com, Airline Checks Claim of “Muslim While Flying” 
Discrimination, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/11/21/passengers.removed/index.html (last visited Sept. 
9, 2007). 
 15. See Justin Florence, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist 
Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2152 (2006); see also Airlines just don’t get it yet, Apr. 2, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17905401/.  
 16. See Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) (discussing a passenger who was subjected to subjective 
security searches and was barred from suing under domestic laws because of complete preemption of 
the Warsaw Convention). 
 17. 49 Stat. 3000 (Oct. 12, 1929) [hereinafter the “Warsaw Convention”]. 
 18. Id. The Warsaw Convention is divided into five chapters. Articles 1 and 2 in chapter one 
explain that the Convention governs international transportation between two contracting parties. 
Chapter two includes Articles 3 through 16, which explain the requirements of the transportation 
documents. Chapter three explains the liability of the carrier. Article 17 states that: 
the carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a 
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the 
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations 
of embarking or disembarking.  
Id. Article 18 expresses the air carrier’s liability for baggage. Articles 19 through 30 further explain 
liability of the air carrier. Chapter four, Article 31, expresses the provisions of combined 
transportation. Chapter five, Articles 32–41, expresses the final general provisions and application of 
the Convention. Id. 
 19. Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001). The Convention “arose out of 
a perceived need to provide a fledgling industry with a uniform set of rules that would govern 
accidents” and provide stability. McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315–16 (1st Cir. 
1995). The United States acceded to the Warsaw Convention on October 29, 1934. Tory A. Weigand, 
Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances Under the Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 891, 892 (2001). 
 20. Id. at 892. 
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While many aspects of the Convention have been modified throughout 
the years to adapt to modern air travel,21 Article 17, which states the 
standard of liability for claims under the Convention, remains 
unchanged.22 This Note examines the history and development of Articles 
17 and 24 of the Warsaw Convention as they relate to air carrier liability 
for injuries in international travel. This Note analyzes the evolution and 
interpretation of Articles 17 and 24, and the Convention’s jurisdiction over 
all international air travel claims resulting in “injury.”  
This Note suggests that courts, especially the United States Supreme 
Court, have interpreted and applied Article 17 inappropriately by limiting 
its scope to only physical injuries. Further, this Note submits that the 
Court erred by expanding the exclusivity clause of Article 24, thereby 
preventing domestic laws from providing relief for incidents not fitting the 
definition of “injury” or for incidents that do not take place on board but 
take place within the broad range of “embarking” and “disembarking.”  
Currently, the Supreme Court allows air carrier agents to police 
international flights with unlimited authority free from suit, because courts 
have narrowly construed accidents and injuries to protect air carriers from 
liability and deny relief to citizens for legitimate non-physical injuries.  
This Note asserts that the Convention should be amended to allow air 
carrier liability for damages resulting from willful employee misconduct, 
including civil rights violations, mental injuries, and emotional distress. 
This Note recommends that the United States maintain the Convention, 
but also call for a new protocol at an international conference, as done in 
the past, to modify liability definitions to appropriately provide 
comprehensive coverage for international air travel. Alternatively, 
Congress should legislate greater protection for its citizens by providing 
multiple means of recovery against air carriers.  
HISTORY 
The Warsaw Convention established a uniform set of rules for 
international air travel. It was the result of global conferences held in Paris 
in 1925 and 1929 addressing international conflicts that resulted from 
 
 
 21. Id. at 893. At the time, the Warsaw Convention was quite forward-thinking in its effort to 
promote uniformity and ensure stability to the airlines. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, 
The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967). Liability limits 
have been raised and modified with The Hague Protocols and Montreal Protocols. See Int’l Air Transp. 
Ass’n, 8 THE LIABILITY REPORTER (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/ 
2EE7CD58-1C6B-429F-9431-EAFDDFAEA0AB/0/2005LiabilityReporter.pdf.  
 22. Weigand, supra note 19, at 893. 
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varying forms of travel documents and questions regarding forum and 
conflict of laws, because international travel crosses jurisdictions.23 Air 
travel, especially international air travel, was in its infancy.24 At the 1929 
conference, the Comité International Technique d’Experts Juridiques 
Aériens (CITEJA), presented a draft of the Warsaw Convention, which 
created a fault-based liability scheme with a monetary limit on a 
passenger’s recovery in case of accident resulting in injury.25  
The Convention sought uniformity among the various customs and 
legal systems of international travelers26 by limiting carriers’ liability in 
case of accident.27 The liability scheme allowed a passenger to recover 
damages for any injury or death if “(a) the claimant was a passenger of an 
international flight;28 (b) the claimant suffered an ‘accident;’29 (c) the 
accident occurred aboard the international flight or in the course of 
embarking or disembarking the international flight;30 and (d) the accident 
caused the passenger to suffer ‘death or wounding . . . .’”31  
 
 
 23. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 498–99.  
 24. Weingard, supra note 19, at 899. Air travel was not accessible for all classes of people. 
Today, because of the development of newer technologies which allow for larger capacity seating and 
more fuel efficiency, routes have established competitive fares which allow all classes of people to 
travel.  
 25. Weigand, supra note 19, at 897–98: 
The Commission asked itself which liability regime had to be adopted: risk or fault. The 
general feeling is that, whilst liability towards third parties must see the application of the risk 
theory, by contrast, in the matter of the carrier’s liability in relation to passengers and goods, 
one must admit the fault theory. 
Id. 
 26. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn supra note 21, at 498. See also Weigand, supra note 19, at 898 
(“Under common law, the carrier is subjected to a heightened duty of care . . . . Under the civil law 
system, a carrier’s duty to passengers is a strict contractual duty to safely transport.”). 
 27. One of the main concerns of the Warsaw Convention was the fear of bankruptcy of air 
carriers in case of a crash. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 499. 
 28. International flights are a single operation, including layovers during the international 
journey. A Denver—to—Chicago flight qualified as international transportation under the Warsaw 
Convention because: the purpose of the plaintiff’s layover in Denver was to make a connection after a 
flight from London; the tickets were sold by the same travel agent; and the parties had knowledge of 
the trip as a single operation. Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 499, 501–02 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
 29. The holding in Saks defined an accident as an “unexpected or unusual event that is external 
to the passenger.” Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985). 
 30. American case law has strained to determine what constitutes an accident that takes place “in 
the course of any operation” or “embarking” or “disembarking.” The courts have not been uniform in 
construing “in the course of . . . embarking and disembarking” as used in Article 17, due perhaps to the 
ambiguous history of the Convention and the changes in air transportation technology since the 
original drafting. 1 AVIATION TORT AND REG. LAW § 11:25. There are three factors which are relevant 
in determining liability under Article 17 within the scope of “embarking” or “disembarking”: (1) 
location of the accident; (2) the activity in which the injured person was engaging; and (3) the control 
by defendant of such injured person at the location and during the activity taking place at the time of 
the accident alleged to be in the course of any of the operations of embarking, and bear significantly 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/7
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Air carriers benefited from the Warsaw Convention because their 
liability was limited to approximately $8,300 United States dollars at the 
time.32 The only concessions the Convention gave to passengers were 
Articles 23 and 20.33 Article 23 rendered null and void any additional 
provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a limit lower 
than the one provided in its text. “Article 20 shifted the burden of proof to 
the carrier, who was required to show that it had taken all necessary 
measures to avoid damages.”34 
The Convention entered into force in February 1933.35 The United 
States was only an observer at the Warsaw Conference,36 but in 1933, the 
Commerce Department requested that the Secretary of State recommend 
that the United States join it, because it favored air carriers with low 
liability limits and it created market uniformity.37 In support of the 
Convention, Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, recommended in 1934: 
 
 
upon the tests of activity and location. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, 550 F.2d 152, 157 (3d 
Cir. 1977). 
 31. The Court concluded that Article 17 allowed recovery “when an accident has caused a 
passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury.” Eastern Airlines v. 
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991). 
 32. The Warsaw Convention was written in French, and it used French currency in determining 
the liability limit. The limit was 125,000 “Poincare francs,” which was low even in 1929, so airlines 
could flourish and to prevent bankruptcy in case of a single catastrophic accident. Lowenfeld & 
Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 499–500. 
 33. “Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which 
is laid down in this convention shall be null and void, but the nullity of any such provision shall not 
involve the nullity of the whole contract, which shall remain subject to the provisions of this 
convention.” Supra note 17. 
 34. 
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary 
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such 
measures.  
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be liable if he proves that 
the damage was occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in 
navigation and that, in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures 
to avoid the damage.  
Id. This standard shifted the burden of proof to the air carrier, which was seen as a balance to the low 
liability limit. Because passengers would be limited in recovery, they would have a concession for not 
having the burden to prove the fault of the air carrier, unless the carrier could demonstrate that all 
reasonable steps were taken. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 21, at 500. 
 35. According to Article 37, the Warsaw Convention would become effective ninety days after 
ratification by five of the High Contracting Parties; Spain, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Romania signed 
initially, followed by France, Poland, and Latvia all on November 15, 1932, and the Convention 
entered into force on February 13, 1933. Great Britain and Italy ratified it on the following day, and by 
the end of 1933 twelve countries were members. Lowenfeld & Mendelson, supra note 21, at 501–02. 
 36. Id. at 502. 
 37. In November of 1933, the Commerce Department wrote to the Secretary of State:  
The Aeronautics Branch has made a study of the Treaty drafted and approved at Warsaw and 
has contacted a number of air transportation operators on the subject. All United States 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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[T]he principle of limitation of liability will not only be beneficial 
to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of 
recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but . . . it will prove to 
be an aid in the development of international air transportation, as 
such limitation will afford the carrier a more definite and equitable 
basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the probable result 
that there would eventually be a reduction of operating expenses for 
the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of 
reduced transportation charges.38  
The United States “deposited its instrument of adherence” to the 
Warsaw Convention on July 31, 1934, and President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt proclaimed it ninety days later.39 
THE PROTOCOLS 
The Warsaw Convention was not perfect. Around the world, critics 
immediately debated the merits of the low liability limit benefiting the air 
carriers.40 A diplomatic conference commenced at The Hague in 
September of 1955 to discuss amending the Convention.41 Arguments 
were made to raise the carrier liability limit in Article 22 and to modify the 
willful misconduct standard in Article 25.42 The United States sought to 
increase the limit on carrier’s ordinary negligence liability to $25,000, but 
settled for $16,600.43 The United States did not originally sign The Hague 
Protocol but did so on June 28, 1956.44  
 
 
operators conducting international air transport services strongly favor adherence to the 
Convention by the United States . . . . The Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, 
the Trade Association Organization representing ninety percent of all United States transport 
operators and one hundred percent of those operating internationally, strong favors 
participation in the Convention. No airline operating at the present time has indicated 
opposition to adherence to the Convention by the United States. 
Id. at 502. 
 38. Id. at 499–500. 
 39. Id. at 502. The State Department transmitted approval to the President, who then submitted 
the Treaty to the Senate. The Senate consented without debate on June 15, 1934. Id. 
 40. Conferences regarding the Warsaw Convention “were held in Cairo in 1946, Madrid in 1951, 
Paris in 1952, and Rio de Janeiro in 1933.” Id. at 502. In Rio de Janeiro, it was recommended the 
liability be raised to a $13,000 limit. Id. at 505. 
 41. Id. at 504–05. 
 42. Negotiations at The Hague clarified the Convention, and the participants agreed that the 
carrier would be subjected to unlimited liability if the plaintiff could prove “that the damage resulted 
from an act of omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or 
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result.” Id. at 505. 
 43. The United States proposed various amendments to the Convention, including the addition of 
legal fees to the award. By a vote of 22–14, The Hague Protocol created the $16,600 ordinary 
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The 1955 Hague Protocol did not solve all of the Convention’s 
perceived problems, nor did it end the liability limit debate even after 
doubling the amount.45 After the Hague Protocol, conventions occurred in 
Guadalajara in 1961, Montreal in 1966, Guatemala City in 1971, and again 
Montreal in both 1975 and 1999.46  
 
 
negligence limit, doubling the amount agreed upon at Warsaw. Id. at 506–07. 
 44. Id. at 516. A lower liability limit than the United States had wanted, combined with the 
United States’ reluctance to have a treaty affect private claims in the United States, caused the U.S. 
delegation to wait to sign the Protocol. The U.S. Ambassador to Poland finally did so in 1956. Id. at 
511–12. 
 45. See Weigand, supra note 19, at 904–05. Five more conventions were held and many of the 
contracting states considered implications of the Convention in their domestic laws. Id. at 902–03. 
 46. The Guadalajara Convention was supplementary to the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 903 n.60. 
The Montreal Convention in 1966 was an interim decision to raise the liability limits. Id. at 902–03. 
The Guatemala City Protocols of 1971 sought to amend the Warsaw Convention with: 
(a) an increase in the liability limits to approximately $100,000; (b) absolute liability for 
injury or death up to the $100,000 limit which could not be overcome by a showing of willful 
misconduct;  
(c) recovery of litigation costs including attorneys’ fees, if allowed for by the national law and 
if the air carrier refused to settle a claim within six months of receiving notice; (d) jurisdiction 
where the passenger was domiciled or had a permanent residence, if the carrier had a place of 
business there; and (e) authority by any country to create a supplemental compensation plan 
funded by passenger contributions in amounts exceeding the absolute limit of $100,000.  
Id. at 905–06 (internal footnotes and citations omitted). 
 The Montreal Protocols in 1975 replaced the French franc with Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Id. 
at 906 n.81 and accompanying text. The SDR was created by the International Monetary Fund and was 
based on the hard currencies of the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and France. 
Id. n.81. The Montreal Protocols of 1975 amended “Article 25’s ‘willful misconduct’ term to an ‘act or 
omission’ of the carrier or its agents committed ‘with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would result’ as the proof needed to escape the liability limit.” Id. at 906. The 
Protocols clarified Article 24 by precluding passengers from bringing claims under local laws when 
they could not establish air carrier liability under the Convention. Id. at 906–07. The Montreal 
Protocols of 1999 initiated unlimited liability. Id. at 909. The Warsaw Convention limited carrier 
liability to approximately $8,300 in case of death or injury to passengers. Id. at 902. The Montreal 
Protocols of 1999 introduced a two-tier liability system. Id. at 908. The first tier included strict liability 
of up to $100,000 SDRs (which at the time was approximately $135,000 U.S. dollars) irrespective of 
the carrier’s fault. Id. at 908–09. The second tier is based on principles of fault of a carrier and has no 
limit of liability. Id. at 909. 
 The Montreal Convention also includes the following new elements:  
(1) In cases of aircraft accidents, air carriers are called upon to provide advance payments 
without delay to assist entitled persons in meeting immediate economic needs with the 
amount of this initial payment subject to natural law and deductible from the final settlement;  
(2) The air carriers must submit proof of insurance, thereby ensuring the availability of 
financial resources in cases of automatic payments or litigation;  
(3) Legal action for damages resulting from the death or injury of a passenger may be filed in 
the country where, at the time of the accident, the passenger had his or her principal and 
permanent residence, subject to certain conditions;  
(4) Facilitation in the recovery of damages without the need for lengthy litigation; and  
(5) Simplification and modernization of documentation related to passengers, baggage, and 
cargo.  
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The International Aviation Transit Association initiated efforts to raise 
the monetary limits under the Warsaw Convention at the Montreal 
Convention of 1999.47 The Montreal Protocols of 1999 created a liability 
scheme which raised the monetary limit to 100,000 Special Drawing 
Rights48 and eliminated the willful misconduct component of Article 25.49 
The Montreal Protocols of 1999 became locally operative on November 4, 
2003, ratified by sixty-two parties.50 Although the United States ratified 
the Montreal Protocols, it exempted itself from Article 57.51 
ARTICLE 17 
The debate since the inception of the Warsaw Convention surrounds 
the low liability monetary limits, the difficulty of meeting the willful 
misconduct standard, and confusion about the application of domestic 
laws.52 With the exception of the Guatemala City Protocol in 1971, Article 
17 has not been the focus of controversy or major discussion at any 
convention.53 However, American courts and courts abroad have struggled 
to interpret and understand Article 17 because of the vagueness of the 
terms “accident” and “injury.”54  
The United States Supreme Court’s struggles in determining Article 
17’s applicability have focused on defining “accident,”55 “injury,”56 and 
 
 
J. C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw System–Montreal 1999, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 429, 441–42 
(2000). 
 47. Weigand, supra note 19, at 907. 
 48. Id. at 908; see also supra note 46.  
 49. Id. at 907. See also Batra, supra note 46, at 438. 
 50. Int’l Air Transp. Ass’n, supra note 21, at 5. The United States signed the Protocol on May 
28, 1999, ratified it on September 5, 2003, and began enforcing it on November 4, 2003. Id. at App. A.  
The instrument of ratification of the United States contains the following declaration: 
“Pursuant to Article 57 of the Convention, the United States of America declares that the 
Convention shall not apply to international carriage by air performed and operated directly by 
the United States of America for non-commercial purposes in respect to the functions and 
duties of the United States of America as a sovereign State.  
Id. at n.6.  
 51. Id. at App. A. 
 52. Weigand, supra note 19, at 910. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., LTD., 516 U.S. 217, 222–23 (1996); Wallace v. 
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 214 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2000); Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc., 
199 F.3d 68, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2000); Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515, 1518–19 (11th 
Cir. 1997); Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1996); Lahey v. Singapore 
Airlines, Ltd., 115 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 55. Lowenfeld, supra note 21. The Supreme Court defined an “accident” as “an unexpected or 
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger,”
 
and further held that an “accident” 
cannot result from “the passenger’s own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation 
of the aircraft.” Saks, 470 U.S. at 405–06. 
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“willful misconduct” as referenced in Article 25.57 Lower courts and 
courts throughout the world have also struggled to determine carrier 
liability when a clear accident or physical manifestation of an injury does 
not exist, but when there is clear airline misconduct.58 In 1999, the United 
States Supreme Court considered Article 17, its application in Article 25, 
and the uniform applicability of the Warsaw Convention in Tseng v. El Al 
Israel Airlines.59 
Article 17 provides that air carriers are liable to their passengers in case 
of death or injury as a result of an accident that took place on the aircraft 
or while in the course of embarking or disembarking.60 A cause of action 
brought under Article 17 requires the application of Article 24, which 
limits Article 17’s scope.61 The United States Supreme Court has 
considered Article 17 on seven occasions in order to fill the gaps in the 
Convention as drafted.62  
ARTICLE 17: DEFINING INJURY AND ACCIDENT  
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted Article 17 in 1985, 
in Air France v. Saks.63 Saks held that in order for an air carrier to be 
liable for damages, the injury suffered by the passenger must result from 
an “unexpected or unusual event which is external” to the passenger.64 The 
 
 
 56. See Floyd, 499 U.S. 530. The Supreme Court held that Article 17 does not allow recovery for 
mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical injury or physical manifestation of the injury. 
Id. at 534, 552. 
 57. Prescod v. AMR, Inc., 383 F.3d 861, 870 (9th Cir. 2004). The act was intentionally done and 
was an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known or so obvious that it must have been taken 
aware of which resulted in harm; it therefore, it was willful misconduct. Id.  
 58. Potgieter v. British Airways, 2005 (3) SA 133 (C) (S.Afr.).  
59.  
 The Convention signatories, in the treaty’s preamble, specifically ‘recognized the 
advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions of . . . the liability of the 
carrier’ . . . [g]iven the Convention’s comprehensive scheme of liability rules and its textual 
emphasis on uniformity, we would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw 
meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, nonuniform liability rules of the individual 
signatory nations.  
Tseng, 525 U.S. at 672. 
 60. Warsaw Convention, supra note 17. 
 61. Loryn B. Zerner, Note, Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw 
Convention: A Cloud Left Uncharted, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1999) (discussing Article 
17’s implications for Article 24 and how it was modified by the Montreal Protocols).  
 62. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 649 (2004); supra notes 4, 29, 31, 54. See also 
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 524 U.S. 116, 118 (1998); Chan v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 
490 U.S. 122, 126 (1989). 
 63. Saks, 470 U.S. 392. 
 64. Id. at 405. 
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Court defined “accident” and clarified that an incident must occur in order 
to cause the injury and the incident must be unexpected, but the Court 
failed to address which types of injuries would be actionable under the 
Convention.65  
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court defined “injury” under 
Article 17 to limit air carriers’ liability to an injury with a physical 
manifestation in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd.66 In Floyd,67 the Supreme 
Court considered the documentary records of the Warsaw Convention 
along with court commentators to conclude that the Convention did not 
consider liability for psychic injury or a broad interpretation of “lésion 
corporelle.”68 The Court noted the French term’s English translation and 
the drafters’ intentions, due to the fact that most were from civil law 
countries.69 The Court concluded that Article 17 did not allow recovery 
“when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical 
injury, or physical manifestation of injury.”70 The Court did not make a 
determination about a passenger’s ability to recover for mental injuries 
accompanying physical injuries.71 
 
 
We conclude that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a 
passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external 
to the passenger. This definition should be flexibly applied after assessment of all the 
circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries. . . . For example, lower courts in this 
country have interpreted Article 17 broadly enough to encompass torts committed by 
terrorists or fellow passengers.  
Husain, 540 U.S. at 405. 
 65. Id. at 406. 
 66. Justice Marshall held in Floyd that Article 17 does not allow recovery for mental or psychic 
injuries unaccompanied by physical injury or physical manifestation of the injury. Infra note 67. 
 67. 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991). 
 68. Id. at 539. “Lesion corporelle” was translated to “bodily injury” and was determined to not 
include physical manifestations of psychic injuries. Id. at 536–37. The Court relied heavily on Saks, 
470 U.S. 392: 
When interpreting a treaty, we begin ‘with the text of the treaty and the context in which the 
written words are used’. . . . ‘[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, 
and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the 
treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.’  
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 534–35. 
 69. Id. at 537.  
[T]he unavailability of compensation for purely psychic injury in many common and civil law 
countries at the time of the Warsaw Conference persuades us that the signatories had no 
specific intent to include such a remedy in the Convention. Because such a remedy was 
unknown in many, if not most, jurisdictions in 1929, the drafters most likely would have felt 
compelled to make an unequivocal reference to purely mental injury if they had specifically 
intended to allow such recovery.  
Id. at 544–45. 
 70. Id. at 552. 
 71. Id. at 552–53. See also id. at 548 n.12 (“At the Hague Conference, the signatories were 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/7
p 161 Rowan book pages.doc12/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 173 
 
 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court most recently decided a case 
interpreting Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention in February 2004 in 
Olympic Airways v. Husain.72 A flight attendant refused three times to 
move an asthmatic passenger further away from the smoking section, even 
though the plaintiff knew before boarding that smoking was permitted on 
the flight.73 Yet, he chose to board the aircraft and remain in his seat.74 He 
was informed that he was free to request another passenger to switch seats 
with him, as a seat change was not to be effected by the Olympic flight 
attendant.75 However, the lower court found that the flight attendant’s 
failure to move the passenger to a different non-smoking seat further away 
from the smoking section of the aircraft violated the carrier’s procedures 
and industry standards, constituted an “accident,” and also demonstrated 
the carrier’s willful misconduct, which allowed for higher monetary 
recovery.76 The Supreme Court held that this conduct constituted an 
“accident” within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.77 
It concluded that the flight attendant’s failure to act was an unexpected or 
unusual event and held in plaintiff’s favor.78  
The Supreme Court held that the “accident” definition should be 
flexibly applied after assessing all circumstances surrounding a 
passenger’s injuries. However, the Court did not expand its definition of 
“injury” noting that the flexibility standard was only with regard to 
“accident” and not “injury” itself.79 Relying on Saks, the Court determined 
that at a minimum, an accident can be an “event” or “happening,” and that 
inaction can constitute an “accident.”80 The Court explained that liability 
 
 
presented with a proposal to amend Article 17 to cover purely mental injuries. The Greek delegation 
proposed adding the word ‘mental’ to Article 17 because it was not clear whether Article 17 allowed 
recovery for such injury”). The Court did not consider this intention because it said it could not “infer 
much from that fact.” Id.  
 72. 540 U.S. 644 (2004). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. at 647. 
 75. Id. at 647–48; Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justice O’Connor, stressed Husain’s 
departure from decisions throughout the world. “Two of our sister signatories have concluded that 
[inaction] cannot [be an accident]. In Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, [2004] 
Q.B. 234, England’s Court of Appeal . . . . and the appellate division of the Supreme Court of Victoria, 
Australia,” in Qantas Ltd. v. Povey, [2003] VSCA 227, 2003 WL 23000692, agreed that “inaction 
itself [cannot] ever be properly described as an accident. It is not an event; it is a non-event. Inaction is 
the antithesis of an accident.” Id. at 658–59. 
 76. Husain, 540 U.S. at 648–49. 
 77. Id. at 657. 
 78. The district court held that the flight attendant’s failure to re-seat the passenger was not 
expected or usual, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. Id. at 648. 
 79. Id. at 657. 
 80. Id. at 656. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 161 Rowan book pages.doc12/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
174 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:161 
 
 
 
 
imposed due to an “accident” under Article 17 implicates Article 25 and 
“these provisions read together tend to show that inaction can give rise to 
liability.”81 Moreover, Article 20(1) clarifies that the “due care” defense is 
unavailable when a carrier has failed to take “all necessary measures to 
avoid the damage.”82 Although Husain leaves the passenger who is injured 
without a physical manifestation with no relief, the Court did liberalize the 
application of “accident,” which will create greater possibilities to recover 
for those with physical injuries. 
OTHER COURTS’ ARTICLE 17 INTERPRETATIONS 
Lower courts have recently struggled with interpreting Article 17, and 
although the Supreme Court has done so, questions still remain about its 
scope.83 In Ehrilich v. American Airlines,84 the Second Circuit reexamined 
the issue of psychic and mental injuries in light of the Montreal Protocols 
of 1999.85 It determined that Article 17 claims for mental injuries would 
only be allowed recovery if they were caused by bodily injuries.86  
 
 
 81. Id. at 657. 
 82. Id. The Montreal Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention amends Article 25 by replacing 
“willful misconduct” with the language “done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with 
knowledge that damage would probably result, as long as the airline’s employee or agent was acting 
within the scope of employment”. The Protocol entered into force after the events of Husain; therefore, 
the Protocol was not considered in that case.  
 83. The Erhlich Court and other courts have struggled with Article 17. Infra note 84. In Prescod, 
383 F.3d 861, personnel took Ms. Neischer’s carry-on bag containing her medication, the later 
mishandling of which led to her death. The court held that the seizure of the carry-on bag was an 
“accident” under Article 17, id. at 868, and constituted “willful misconduct” under Article 25. Id. at 
870. The willful misconduct determination is based on a subjective standard and can be satisfied 
through circumstantial evidence. Id. “Neischer was repeatedly promised action that was or should have 
been within the defendants’ power to deliver”. . . . The act was intentionally done and was of “an 
unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known or so obvious that it must have been taken aware 
of it,” which resulted in harm. Therefore, it was willful misconduct. Id. at 870. 
 84. 360 F.3d 366, 391 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 85. Id. While plaintiffs argued that several delegates to the Montreal Conference discussed 
expanding the carrier’s liability to include mental injuries, the delegates ultimately approved “a 
liability provision in the new Montreal Convention that provides, much like Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention, that a ‘carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury.’” Id. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the delegates’ comments at the Montreal Conference in 
May 1999 were not entitled to any dispositive weight. Id. at 373. 
 86. Id. at 400. (“The government’s interpretation of Article 17 is faithful to the Warsaw 
Convention’s text, negotiating history, purposes, and the judicial decision of sister Convention 
signatories; as such, we ascribe ‘great weight’ to the government’s views concerning the meaning of 
that provision.”) Lower courts are also defining Article 17 terms that the Supreme Court has not 
addressed, but they give greater weight to the interpretations that the government, as a signatory, gave 
to the Convention than to higher court’s interpretations.  
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A California district court further examined Article 17’s test for 
allowance of mental injuries in In re Crash at Tapei.87 The court 
concluded that plaintiffs could only recover for psychological injuries that 
are caused by bodily injury, and even a development of post-traumatic 
stress disorder did not per se qualify for recovery even though the disorder 
has physical effects.88  
Lower courts have considered the applicability of injuries that did not 
take place on board an aircraft but rather during embarkation.89 In Hansen 
v. Delta Air Lines,90 a Delta employee reported that Ms. Hansen said 
“bomb,” which led to her arrest at the boarding gate in Chicago en route to 
Manchester, England.91 She and her husband had received their boarding 
passes, cooperated with all requests and questions of Delta employees, and 
proceeded through security.92 When she and her husband reached the 
boarding line for their flight, they were arrested and transported to a 
Chicago Police station, where the police searched, photographed, 
handcuffed, and jailed Ms. Hansen.93  
Ms. Hansen filed a claim against Delta for false imprisonment, 
malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.94 
Delta sought to dismiss her claims because emotional injuries are not 
recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.95 The district 
court considered whether plaintiff was in the “course of embarking” at the 
time of the incident by analyzing the following three factors: (1) the 
 
 
 87. 2004 WL 1234131 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2004) rev’d on other grounds, 153 Fed. App’x. 993 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
 88. Specifically, the Court concluded:  
(1) plaintiffs may not recover in cases where the only injury suffered is a psychological 
injury; (2) plaintiffs may not recover for psychological injuries that accompany, but are not 
caused by bodily injury; (3) plaintiffs may recover for mental or psychological injuries caused 
by physical injuries suffered in an air crash; (4) plaintiffs may not recover for physical 
manifestations of psychological injuries unless the underlying psychological injury was 
caused by a bodily injury; and (5) a diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 
without more, does not satisfy the bodily injury requirement of Article 17. Plaintiffs may 
recover for PTSD that resulted from a bodily injury, including an actual physical injury to the 
brain. However, plaintiffs may not recover for PTSD that resulted from the stress of the 
accident, even if the PTSD, in turn, resulted in physical changes to the brain or other physical 
manifestations.  
Id. 
 89. See Hansen v. Delta Air Lines, 2004 WL 524686 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2004). 
 90. 2004 WL 524686 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2004). 
 91. Id. at *1. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at *2. 
 95. Id. at *5. Article 17, as defined by Floyd, clarified by Ehrlich, and stated in In Re Tapei, does 
not allow for recovery of emotional injuries.  
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passenger’s location at the time of the injury; (2) the passenger’s activity 
at the time of the injury; and (3) the degree of control the airline was 
exercising over the passenger when the injury occurred.96 
The court could not determine whether or not Ms. Hansen was 
“embarking” because the facts lacked specificity with respect to the 
plaintiff’s distance from the gate, her proximity to the Delta controlled 
gate area, and her actions at the time of her arrest with relation only to the 
act of boarding.97 Such expansive readings of “embarking” and 
“disembarking” have consequences for “injury,” because being arrested 
while in the gate area has physical characteristics not necessarily 
implicated while sitting on a plane. The court failed to further inquire as to 
Ms. Hansen’s “injury,” but the circumstances clearly indicate that the 
applicability can be expansive while the burden is overwhelmingly high 
on the part of the passenger to prove that he or she was injured, that he or 
she was not within the scope of the Convention, and that the air carrier 
acted with willful misconduct.98 Further, the expansion to events that 
occur outside or during security checkpoints creates a scope far outside 
passenger expectations. The Warsaw Convention extends to the first 
location of embarkation, including domestic flights when a passenger’s 
final destination is international, until final arrival through security.99 
Courts in jurisdictions throughout the world have faced similar 
problems surrounding Article 17.100 In Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines, a 15-year old girl awoke during the flight to find a male 
passenger caressing her thigh.101 She sought recovery for clinical 
depression which was a result of the incident by the male passenger, but 
the House of Lords in Britain rejected the claim because there was no 
“physical injury” even though the passenger touched her.102  
In Potgieter v. British Airways,103 a gay man brought a claim against 
British Airways in South Africa alleging that he was “humiliated and 
 
 
 96. The factors used to determine “embarking” were set out in Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 
F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 617–18 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
 97. Hansen, 2004 WL 524686 at *5. 
 98. Id. The Convention was intended to give the benefit of the proof standards to the passenger 
and force the air carrier to defend itself, but the case here demonstrates that when the facts are in 
dispute the passenger is not given the benefit because the air carrier can prove exclusivity more 
expansively while the passenger has a very narrow construction of injury to demonstrate. See 
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 27. 
 99. Supra note 28. 
 100. Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (2002) Q.B. 100. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. 2005 (3) SA 133 (c) (S. Afr.). 
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degraded” and his “dignity was severely impaired” when a flight attendant 
approached him and his partner, demanding that they “not kiss each other 
as doing so was offensive to other passengers on the flight.”104
 
The Court 
held that the Warsaw Convention was the sole basis upon which the 
plaintiff could seek relief. However, because the air carrier was not liable 
for any conduct not resulting in a physical injury, he did not state a 
recognized “injury” under the Warsaw Convention.105 
ARTICLE 24: EXCLUSIVITY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION 
Article 17 interpretation leaves the passengers such as Potgeiger or 
Hansen, whose civil rights have been violated, resulting in emotional or 
psychic injuries, without a cause of action.106 U.S. domestic laws provide 
no form of relief, as stated by the Supreme Court in Tseng v. El Al 
Israel.107 Further, a passenger on a domestic flight is protected by the 
Convention only if the airplane’s eventual destination is international.108 
 
 
 104. Plaintiff and his partner allegedly hugged and kissed each other “in a normal way and manner 
which anyone would have accepted had such a kiss and embrace been between two heterosexual 
people.” Potgieter, (3) SA 133. 
 105.  
Plaintiff’s main cause of action relied on defendant’s breach of contract and an alternative 
cause of action was based on the acto iniuriarum. Defendant filed an exception to plaintiff’s 
claim which was based upon the proposition that the Warsaw Convention provided the 
exclusive cause of action and sole remedy for a passenger who claims for loss, injury and 
damages sustained in the course, or arising out, of his international carriage. The High Court 
of South Africa agreed with defendant and held that because plaintiff’s main and alternative 
causes of action were not based on the Warsaw Convention, they could not be sustained in 
law. In addition, because plaintiff did not allege death, wounding or other bodily injury 
suffered by him as a result of an accident, the defendant could not be liable in terms of Article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention.  
Id. 
 106. A similar incident to Potgeiter occurred on an American Airlines flight from Paris to New 
York City. Gay males were labeled “offensive” and were prohibited from actions which are generally 
accepted for heterosexual couples. The flight attendant’s instructions and threats of prosecution 
potentially injured the couple. Lauren Collins, Air Kiss, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 25, 2006, at 66.  
 107. 525 U.S. 155 (1999). The Supreme Court quashed the viability of a state law claim for 
personal injuries when the Convention foreclosed recovery. Id. at 176. The plaintiff, Tsui Yuan Tseng, 
was traveling from New York to Tel Aviv. Id. at 160. The security guard classified her as high risk and 
subjected her to a security search. Id. at 163. Tseng sued in New York state court citing significant 
personal injury in the course of the search and seizure of her person and belongings. Id. at 164. El Al 
Israel Airlines argued that Tseng’s action came within the purview of the Warsaw Convention and she 
could not sue under state law. Id. at 168–70. The Second Circuit heard the appeal and concluded that 
Tseng was entitled to pursue her state law injury claim because her injuries were not the result of an 
accident as defined in Article 17, and then Tseng appealed to the Supreme Court. See Zerner, supra 
note 61, at 1263–65. 
 108. Robertson, 401 F.3d 499. 
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The Supreme Court in Tseng analyzed Article 24’s exclusivity 
clause.109 The Court considered the Convention in light of its drafting 
history. It concluded that the Convention is the exhaustive remedy for 
injuries on international flights, due to the goal of creating uniformity in 
international travel laws.110 The Court held that Article 24 created an 
exclusive cause of action for air carrier liability. It rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that when a passenger’s personal injury suit does not satisfy the 
liability conditions of Article 17, this passenger is able to pursue them 
under local law.111 
Based on Tseng, any incident that harms a passenger while aboard, 
embarking, or disembarking an international flight will be governed by the 
Warsaw Convention and the various protocols.112 Air carrier liability is 
limited not only by the monetary limit, but more importantly, by the 
courts’ interpretation of “injury.” Though passengers are entitled to 
monetary relief from physical injuries, no interpretations or amendments 
protect citizens suffering injuries from an air carrier’s willful misconduct 
resulting in mental injury.113 The result allows discrimination, racial 
profiling and harm to passenger civil rights, and other incidents causing 
passengers mental injuries and emotional distress.114 
 
 
 109. Zerner, supra note 61, at 1265.  
Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the 
meaning of an international treaty. . . . We conclude that the Government’s construction of 
Article 24 is most faithful to the Convention’s text, purpose, and overall structure. . . . The 
cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention . . . is to achieve uniformity of rules governing 
claims arising from international air transportation. . . . The Convention signatories, in the 
treaty’s preamble, specifically recognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner 
the conditions of the liability of the carrier . . . [g]iven the Convention’s comprehensive 
scheme of liability rules and its textual emphasis on uniformity, we would be hard put to 
conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, nonuniform 
liability rules of the individual signatory nations.  
Tseng, 525 U.S. at 168–69 (internal quotations omitted). See also Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 230.  
 110. See Zerner, supra note 61, at 1267.  
Looking to the Convention’s text, negotiating and drafting history, contracting states’ post 
ratification understanding of the Convention, and scholarly commentary, the Court in 
Zicherman determined that Warsaw drafters intended to resolve whether there is liability, but 
to leave to domestic law . . . determination of the compensatory damages available to the 
suitor.  
Tseng, 516 U.S. at 170. 
 111. Zerner, supra note 61, at 1266. Tseng has been used extensively in lower court decisions 
since the ruling. See, e.g., Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 161 (2nd Cir. 2003) 
(“A passenger whose injuries fall within the scope of the Warsaw Convention, is either entitled to 
recovery under the Convention or not at all.”). 
 112. Tseng, 525 U.S. at 169.  
 113. Supra note 46. 
 114. Emotional injuries have been limited to those which have a physical manifestation as 
indicated in the decisions in Floyd, Ehlrich, and In re Taipei. Supra note 16. 
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERPRETATIONS 
There is a disconnect in the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
purpose and scope of the Warsaw Convention.115 While the Court has 
concluded that the intentions behind the Convention are open to 
interpretation because it is a treaty, the Court has chosen mutually 
exclusive interpretations.116 The Court has determined that the Warsaw 
Convention was intended to be a widespread and sweeping treaty 
governing all injuries on international flights.117 However, the Court has 
also determined that the Convention does not govern all injuries suffered 
on international travel, because it is only supposed to address injuries with 
physical manifestations.118 Yet, with lower courts’ broad interpretations of 
“embarking” and “disembarking” to include incidents not physically in the 
aircraft and to extend as far as security screenings,119 the United States 
courts have created complete exclusivity of the Convention120 without 
exceptions for the new invasive post 9/11 security tactics.121 The Court has 
 
 
 115. The Supreme Court held in Tseng that “the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from 
maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the 
conditions for liability under the Convention,” id. at 176, because the Warsaw Convention was created 
to unify the laws governing international air travel. However, the Court previously held in Saks that 
the Convention could not be stretched to cover injuries that are not caused by accidents. Id. If the 
Convention was drafted specifically to cover injuries caused by accidents, it cannot possibly account 
for all misconduct by airline employees, including racial profiling and discrimination. See supra note 
58. 
 116. Whenever possible, interpretations of a treaty that produce anomalous or illogical results 
should be avoided. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 157. 
 117. Id. at 176. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. “Embarking” and “disembarking” are determined in view of the total circumstances 
surrounding the incident in question with particular emphasis on location, activity, control, and 
immediacy of the flight. “Embarking” is not limited to the time after the ticket has been collected and 
honored for travel and the passenger have passed through the gate check where the boarding stub is 
given as suggested in Marotte v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). See also 
Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 276 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that a passenger 
who was at the ticket counter but had not received a boarding pass and was released to a public area 
had not embarked).  
 120. The Warsaw Convention extends in scope to all “‘passenger injuries occurring on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking and disembarking’— even if the claim is 
not actionable under the treaty.” Singh v. N. Am. Airlines, 426 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45–46 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006). “The Convention is preemptive: a carrier is not subject to liability under local law for passenger 
injuries ‘covered up’ by the Convention, that is, ‘all personal injury cases stemming from occurrences 
on board an aircraft or in embarking or disembarking.’” Acevedo-Reinoso v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de 
Espana S.A., 449 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2006). Claims of state law are preempted by the Warsaw 
Convention because the treaty precludes passengers from bringing actions under local law when they 
cannot establish carrier liability under the framework of the treaty. Adegbuji v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 
2005 WL 2972830 at *2 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 121. “In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 597 (2001), 
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given a license to flight attendants, crew, and airline personnel to become 
judges within their international flight jurisdiction. 
We do not know the array of incidents that have caused injuries for 
passengers because the courts have shut the door on air carrier liability. 
The process of judicial review cannot be relied upon to advance rights, 
because so many of the cases are dismissed or not brought because of the 
limited definition of Article 17 and the expansion of Article 24.  
Freedoms are defended in the courts, but when there are no freedoms to 
be had on international flights the courts give legitimacy to invasive 
procedures, morality judgments, and discrimination by air carriers. Recent 
news stories clearly illustrate outrageous conduct by air carrier personnel 
in the interest of airline security.122 In Spain, airline personnel demanded 
that a law professor allow his carry-on baggage to be searched by fellow 
passengers because those fellow passengers were uncomfortable because 
“he looked like a terrorist.”123 In Australia, a man was prevented from 
flying because he was wearing a shirt that said, “George Bush is a 
terrorist.”124 In the United States, two gay men were told by a flight 
attendant that their behavior, described to be “kissing,” was disturbing to 
other passengers and creating a security risk.125 The crew, including the 
pilot, threatened the men with prosecution.126  
The Warsaw Convention, as currently interpreted, provides passengers 
with no means of recovery for these incidents. Although these passengers 
perhaps have domestic law claims ranging from Equal Protection, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress to invasion of privacy, these injuries are not sufficient 
to allow for recovery. At the same time, the Convention is their only 
means of recovery due to Article 24’s exclusivity clause because the 
incidents took place within the scope of international travel. 
 
 
enhancing security measures at the nation’s airports, including the eventual federalization of the 
passenger screening function. . . . [A]irport security and passenger screening are . . . wholly 
independent of the Warsaw Convention.” Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934, 939 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
 122. Australian Prohibited from Being a Passenger for Wearing a Shirt Accusing Bush of Being a 
Terrorist, EL PAIS (Spain), http://www.elpais.com/articulo/gente/aerolinea/australiana/prohibe/volar/ 
pasajero/vestido/camiseta/acusa/Bush/terrorista/elpepugen/20070122elpepuage_2/Tes (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2007). Jessica Bernstein-Wax, Man Forced Off Plane By Fellow Passengers, THE SEATTLE 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at A9, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/ 
2003280615_passenger29.html. NBC, Passenger Awarded $400,000 in Racial Profiling Case, 
http://www.nbc6.net/news/10754704/detail.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).  
 123. Bernstein-Wax, supra note 122. 
 124. EL PAIS, supra note 122. 
 125. Collins, supra note 106. 
 126. Id. 
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Courts will not be able to hear cases which could cause legitimate harm 
to individuals. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
constitutional doctrines such as standing, mootness, and ripeness can 
relieve strain on the courts, citizens who suffer non-physical damage under 
the Convention will not be allowed to have their day in court. Air carriers 
have an important role in providing security for passengers on 
international travel; however, actions under the guise of security measures 
should not permit their outrageous conduct.  
CHANGES NECESSARY TO PROTECT PASSENGERS 
The United States Supreme Court has expanded the Convention’s 
scope and limited its liability so that passengers who suffer very real 
injuries such as psychic episodes,127 search and seizure violations,128 and 
civil rights violations129 are left with no forum for justice. Judicial 
activism is not the answer to the Convention’s problems: Congress must 
change the Convention’s applicability.  
The Warsaw Convention is a validly ratified international treaty, so it is 
equivalent to a federal statute.130 When a conflict arises between a treaty 
and a congressional statute, the one later enacted is controlling.131 
Therefore, Congress should override the Warsaw Convention by enacting 
a new statute, which would conflict with the Convention.132 
The Convention, which was intended to protect air carriers from 
catastrophes, is now protecting air carriers from all liability, including its 
crew’s willful misconduct.133 The Court allows flight attendants to 
determine appropriate measures, short of physical injury, to regulate 
passengers on international flights.134 Domestic laws provide no relief to 
passengers,135 and therefore, changes are needed to the Convention.  
 
 
 127. Morris, supra note 100 (A 15-year old girl awoke during the flight to find a male passenger 
caressing her thigh. She sought recovery for clinical depression resulting from the incident, but the 
House of Lords rejected the claim because there was no “physical injury.”). 
 128. Bernstein-Wax, supra note 122 (A Spanish law professor on a trip from Germany to Spain 
was forced to have his bags searched when it was demanded by airline personnel because his 
appearance was “suspicious” and he “looked like a terrorist.”).  
 129. United States domestic laws have provided relief for those who have suffered harm due to 
civil rights violations including racial profiling. NBC, supra note 122. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; See also LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(Foundation Press 1988).  
 131. Id. “The last expression of the sovereign will must control.” 
 132. Id. 
 133. Supra notes 1, 58, 122.  
 134. Supra note 58. 
 135. The Warsaw Convention extends in scope to all passenger “injuries” occurring onboard the 
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The United States sought to protect consumers when it pushed for 
higher liability limits.136 If Congress does not create a new statute 
resulting in conflict of applicability, it should again move for changes in 
the Convention. In order to preserve passengers’ rights, the Convention 
should allow for domestic law recovery for passengers who have suffered 
injuries without a clear physical component. Further, the Convention 
should explicitly provide for recovery when flight attendants willfully 
violate passengers’ rights by discriminating against them because of sex, 
gender, sexual orientation, race, class, religion, or creed to prevent 
incidents such as those which gave rise to Potgeiger.137 
If a new protocol regarding civil rights is deemed outside the scope of 
the Convention due to the intention of limiting relief to physical 
injuries,138 then the exclusivity clause of the Convention must be 
reinterpreted, along with the definitions of “embarking” and 
“disembarking,” to allow for domestic law claims to be filed and to protect 
passengers from the air carriers.  
The United States has a strong interest in protecting its passengers 
domestically, but due to the nature of the Convention to create uniformity 
and avoid conflict of law problems, the United States should protect its 
citizens when flying abroad. With airlines without any flights originating 
or terminating in the United States, Americans will be on flights where the 
United States court system will lack jurisdiction. Therefore, the United 
States should not reject the Convention altogether but should modify its 
position regarding the Convention’s applicability.139 The Warsaw 
Convention creates many benefits for passengers as well as air carriers, 
and while there are problems with Articles 17 and 24, some of the 
provisions, including recovery for lost baggage, have provided the best 
possible means of recovery. 
 
 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking and disembarking, even if the claim is 
not actionable under the treaty. Singh v. N. Am. Airlines, 426 F. Supp. 2d 38. (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 136. Supra notes 43–44. 
 137. Article 24 now allows recovery without limitation when it is due to the willful misconduct of 
the air carrier. Supra note 61. However, the proposed protocol would allow for recovery to include the 
willful misconduct of discrimination resulting in emotional injuries. 
 138. The Court in Floyd determined that the Convention was only intended to allow recovery for 
physical manifestations of injuries. Supra note 31. 
 139. The Japanese have initiated a proposal which would allow for absolute unlimited liability in 
international air travel on the theory that it will increase settlements and lower litigation. Naneen K. 
Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 437 (1996); see also 
Jonathan L. Neville, The International Air Transportation Association’s Attempt to Modify 
International Air Disaster Liability: An Admirable Effort with an Impossible Goal, 27 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 571 (1999) (suggesting that the United States should modify its position on the treaty if not 
reject it altogether).  
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CONCLUSION 
The Convention was created during international air travel’s infancy, 
when air carriers needed protection from bankruptcy in case of a crash or 
other disaster. The modern era of flight has changed the need for the 
Convention altogether. Large companies and their alliances do not need 
liability protection to the extent provided by the Supreme Court.  
The United States, for its part in protecting citizens by raising liability 
limits, should not simply write off the Convention as has been suggested 
by some scholars. In order to protect its own citizens to the best extent 
possible, the United States should call for a new protocol to the 
Convention to ensure protection and allow for passengers to rightfully 
recover for real injuries suffered. Congress could also take the initiative to 
override the Convention’s applicability by enacting new legislation. The 
role of international travel in modern society will not decrease, and with 
the modernization of airports, aircraft, and security measures, law must be 
modernized in order to best protect citizens’ rights. 
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